Rethinking the Mexico U.S. border.. Two Parts ... Not good.

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 http://www.pacificcouncil.org/
Explore this site. Notice how a number of people are tied to this administration.

Let the so called "assault" weapons ban begin and say good bye to our sovereignty.

Rethinking the Mexico-U.S. Border:
Seeking Cooperative Solutions to Common Problems

Joint Task Force sponsored by
the Pacific Council on International Policy
and the Mexican Council on Foreign Relations

Concept Paper


Overview
One of the longest borders in the world, the frontier between Mexico and the U.S. represents the best and the worst in national boundaries. On the one hand, it is the site of over $300 billion in trade each year. Millions of people cross the border each year for work and tourism; the vast majority of crossings are legal and unproblematic. On the other hand, the 100-kilometer strip on each side of the frontier ? the official ?border region? ? has become the locus of crime, poverty, and environmental degradation, as well as the gateway for massive undocumented migration.

Some of these problems are new or have grown more severe over the last several years ? most notably, increasing violence related to the drug trade in most border towns. Others (such as conflicts around migration) are familiar, longstanding concerns. All of these issues, however, could benefit from fresh perspectives that take into account the current economic, demographic and political contexts in both countries. In many cases, changing perspectives in both countries have made possible more innovative forms cross-border collaboration. For instance, recognition of the seriousness of the security situation along the border has encouraged more flexible thinking in areas where sensitivity about national sovereignty once constrained cooperation.

This Task Force will provide analytically informed prescriptions for the U.S.-Mexico border region in five policy areas: public safety, migration, facilitation of legal transit and commerce, economic development, and border institutions. Although any discussion of national boundaries necessarily involves questions of national policy, the Task Force will not focus on government-to-government relations at the federal level. Rather, it will direct its efforts primarily toward what is happening in the border area itself ? that is, toward the problems confronting communities that dot and straddle the frontier.

The Task Force will first describe the situation on the ground today, noting the changes that continuing economic integration in North America, globalization, and other forces have produced over the last five years. Key elements of this diagnostic include not only salient problems but also ?bright spots? along the frontier where state and local actors have devised practical solutions to the challenges they confront (e.g., on certain environmental issues). Second, the Task Force will offer a series of recommendations in the five areas mentioned above. These recommendations will provide a long-term vision for the border region, premised on the notion of seeking common solutions to shared problems, and offer feasible, timely solutions to pressing problems.  



Institutions
At present, efforts to manage the bilateral relationship range dramatically in scale and scope ? from smaller-scale initiatives that normally fly under the national media?s radar screen (e.g., the bilateral ?Scrap Tire Integrated Management Initiative? or discussions at the Border Governors Conference on the use of environmental education tools in classrooms) to massive federal projects like the U.S. Department of Homeland Security?s Secure Border Initiative.

Collaborative efforts also vary dramatically in approach. At one extreme, water projects sponsored by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency?s ?Border 2012? initiative place an emphasis on community involvement, transparency, and bottom-up development of needs. At the other extreme, the trilateral (including Canada) Security and Prosperity Partnership is a centralized, closed-door process run through federal governments with input primarily from leading national business associations.  

One final way in which current institutions vary is the extent to which they involve bilateral consultation. U.S. border control policies have been designed and carried out without meaningful Mexican participation; the laissez faire approach to northward migration adopted by the Mexican government (based on a particular interpretation of the Mexican federal Constitution) has been, in its own way, equally unilateral. By contrast, the 2007 M?rida Initiative, which links the United States, Mexico, and the Central American countries in broad-based cooperation on regional security issues, is a more collaborative endeavor.

Long-term management of the border region may require the conversion or elimination of existing institutions and the creation of new ones. The Task Force will consider which institutions are most in need of reform, focusing in particular on the International Boundary and Water Commission (IWBC) ? created in 1944 and much criticized in recent years as obsolete ? and the Border Governors Conference. It will also examine analogous institutions outside the region (the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, the U.S.-Canadian Great Lakes Commission, the Pacific Northwest Economic Region, the trinational Basel airport, etc.) that could provide useful models for managing economic and social concerns in the U.S.-Mexico border area.

In developing its recommendations, one issue the Task Force will explore is the degree to which the border region could benefit from replacing the host of disparate, issue-specific institutions that currently exist with a small number of border-wide coordinating institutions. Possibilities include (1) separate national or binational entities whose mandate would be confined to specific issues (e.g., border crossing facilitation or electricity), (2) mirror-image national Border Authorities in each country, or (3) a single binational Border Authority. The Task Force will also address how lessons from scattered collaborative efforts can be disseminated throughout the border region. For instance, the 50 year-old Arizona-Mexico Commission, which links government officials, business executives and civic leaders in Arizona and Sonora, is widely regarded as a successful example of sub-national collaboration on a range of transborder issues. Yet California and Texas do not have similar institutions in place. Should Arizona?s example be expanded to these key states? Finally, the Task Force will also consider whether, over the long run, border institutions should become more or less centralized in operation and scope.

 
Public safety
Over the last five years, public safety along the border has deteriorated sharply. Criminal networks increasingly operate across the frontier, unencumbered by the jurisdictional issues that hamper collaboration among local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies in both countries. Attempts by the Mexican federal government to re-impose law and order in the major border towns, including the deployment of army units, have produced only partial and potentially evanescent success. One senior Mexican politician recently expressed concern about the possible ?Colombianization? of the frontier ? i.e., that the Mexican state would prove unable to defeat its criminal rivals in the border region.

The principal cause of worsening security conditions is a massive, illegal trade in drugs and arms. The U.S. has traditionally emphasized the former, whereas Mexican authorities have focused on stopping the southward flow of high-powered automatic weapons and ammunition. In reality, this two-way flow of contraband is mutually reinforcing, as drug traffickers need guns to protect their illegal trade and criminal networks are among the main purchasers of arms and ammunition in the border region. The Task Force will examine whether the symbiotic nature of drug trafficking and gun running requires some alteration in traditional models of border control, in which governments have cared about what comes into their jurisdictions rather than what goes out.

A second issue for the Task Force to explore is the current approach to sharing information about suspected traffickers or other criminals. In a conventional U.S. law enforcement context, intelligence agencies are often reluctant to pass on information they have acquired local law enforcement officials out of concern that subsequent legal proceedings would compromise classified sources and methods. In theory, however, the border is an area where entry can be denied without revealing the information on which such a decision is based and where detention need not inevitably result in prosecution. (Individuals who were denied entry but subsequently entered the country illegally could then be apprehended and prosecuted on that basis.) The Task Force will examine the potential costs and benefits of shifting from a traditional prosecutorial approach toward an interdiction model in preventing the movement of criminals across the border.

One final issue the Task Force will address concerns the weight that local, state, and federal authorities in both countries give to different aspects of public safety. In Washington, ?border security? is often taken to mean ?national security along the border?. For residents in the border region, such an approach underemphasizes quotidian issues of law enforcement and preparedness for emergencies not related to terrorism (such as natural disasters and epidemics). The Task Force will consider how best to balance potentially competing priorities between local communities and national capitals.

Migration
Migration is an issue that affects communities far away from the border itself. On the U.S. side, the sheer extent of undocumented migration from Mexico has produced calls for physical barriers and other policies designed to reduce the number of immigrants. On the Mexican side, the safety of migrants and the treatment of Mexicans living in the U.S. have become salient public issues.

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Although the Task Force will consider these national-level issues, it will focus primarily on the impact of migration ? and national responses to migration ? on the border region itself. Specific topics for discussion include how state and local governments can comply with federally-imposed constitutional guarantees of education for all children without regard to their immigration status; how to provide health care for undocumented workers and their families; how to incorporate state and local concerns into the design and implementation of federal regulations; and how to ensure the full participation in American life of those immigrants who are granted a path to citizenship. This last issue includes not only topical debates about specific policies (e.g., the provision of drivers? licenses to residents regardless of immigration status) but also larger questions about the integration of immigrants who settle in the border region into the social, linguistic, economic, and political life of the communities in which they come to reside.

Residents in the border region often bear a disproportionate cost from national policies, as when more aggressive deployment of physical barriers splits communities down the middle. In this sense, the needs of local residents complicate federal policy-making. However, the experience of communities in the border region can also suggest solutions to national dilemmas. For instance, the border region would be logical place in which to experiment with temporary worker programs that might ultimately become part of a comprehensive immigration reform.

Facilitation
Much of the congestion at the border reflects the fact that the U.S.-Mexico frontier is treated as a ?line? rather than a ?buffer zone? or economic region. In theory, moving some of what is currently done at the border (e.g., product inspections) away from the physical frontier could depressurize now-overwhelmed border crossing points and allow officials there to concentrate their attention on the very small number of targets that pose a potential threat to public health or safety. The Task Force will examine the potential risks and rewards of adopting such an approach.

One increasingly common recommendation concerns the exploitation of new technology to relieve congestion at the frontier without compromising federal inspection services. The Task Force will examine the degree to which new tools like rad/nuke sensors and non-intrusive inspection systems can in fact replace traditional inspections. It will also address whether such technologies, if effective, should be more widely deployed ?behind the border? in both countries.

In theory, the more non-risky individuals who can be identified and pre-cleared, the more officials can focus their attention on the remainder and the less hassle ordinary citizens will face at the frontier. Such facilitation is crucial for residents of border communities, many of whom cross the frontier as part of their daily lives. The Task Force will assess whether there are ways to expedite border crossings to meet local needs that do not materially increase the risk of criminals or terrorists gaining entry. It will also consider the degree to which such efforts at facilitation should remain entirely unilateral rather than developed jointly by Mexican and U.S. authorities.

Another issue for the Task Force to consider involves trade in services as well as goods. In terrestrial broadcast media and telecommunications, current national regulations effectively bifurcate territories that naturally constitute a single market. Treating the border as a shared economic space rather than a clear boundary might permit flexibility in how national regulations are applied to adjacent communities on different sides of the frontier. The Task Force will examine whether it is feasible to reduce costs for firms and consumers in these sectors without full regulatory harmonization.


Development
Economic development remains a pressing concern for many border communities. On the U.S. side, with the exception of San Diego and El Paso, the border region remains substantially poorer than the rest of the country. On the Mexican side, although border towns are often wealthier than those in the interior of the country, large numbers of resident lack access to basic public services.

Economic development depends in part on physical infrastructure ? roads, bridges, water distribution and treatment facilities, airports, ports, commercial parks, and even residential housing. At present, efforts to provide these public goods are poorly coordinated or even actively hampered by national authorities; the success stories that do emerge are rarely replicated at other sites along the border. Neither country has a comprehensive plan of the border region as an integrated trade and investment zone. One question the Task Force will take up is the degree to which local governments and investors can work together across the border on binational projects. Another possibility to be considered, not necessarily exclusive of the first, is the establishment of a binational Border Development Authority with greater funding, authority, and operational flexibility than the North American Development Bank and the Border Environmental Cooperation Commission.

Environmental issues offer many positive cases of binational cooperation. Over the past decade, the two federal governments and a multiplicity of state and local actors have developed joint institutions to address the problems caused by burgeoning population growth in the border region. Yet this level of cooperation does not extend to the management of natural resources, especially the critical issue of water use and management of river systems.

A related issue concerns energy. At present, patterns of electricity production and distribution do not reflect the natural markets created by transborder communities. At the ?other end? of energy generation, there are few examples of binational efforts to control emissions. Several western U.S. states and Canadian provinces have recently announced a proposed regional carbon trading system; the Task Force will consider whether government in the border region can or should develop a similar device. Finally, the Task Force will examine whether the sorts of public-private partnerships that could be used to develop physical infrastructure might also be used to develop alternative sources of energy.

In terms of resource management, the Task Force will debate how best to balance the demands of border residents with those of federal policy-makers. For example, water use policies must balance subsidies for agriculture and industry, sustainable use strategies, conservation efforts, the provision of drinking water for people in the region, and the like. The traditional prioritization given to these issues might be as above. From a ?bottom-up? perspective, however, the priorities might be reversed; that is, ordinary people living in the border region would put most emphasis on the availability of clean drinking water. As with law enforcement and border facilitation, the Task Force will need to wrestle with the proper balance among these competing priorities.

Project team
The Pacific Council on International Policy (PCIP) and the Mexican Council on Foreign Relations (COMEXI) will provide overall direction for the project. COMEXI is an independent, non-partisan organization committed to promoting pluralistic discussion of Mexican foreign policy and Mexico?s role in the international arena. Its members include prominent individuals from government, industry, finance, academia, and the mass media. PCIP is an independent, non-partisan organization dedicated to bringing a West Coast perspective to bear on the role of the U.S. in a changing world. Its members include leaders and innovators in business, academia, politics, government, technology, media, law, entertainment, and the arts. The Task Force will be funded by COMEXI and PCIP, with support from foundations, corporations and individuals.

Members of the Task Force include prominent individuals each from both countries ? business executives, former government officials, civic leaders, and policy experts ? reflecting a range of opinions and constituencies but sharing an interest in the border region. (A list of members is attached.) The Task Force will also commission short papers from outside experts on their areas of expertise (e.g., lessons from European guest worker programs or infrastructure financing schemes).

Alan Bersin and Andr?s Rozental will serve as co-Chairs of the Task Force.  Bersin is former Secretary of Education of California, former U.S. Attorney for Southern California, and former Southwest ?border czar?; he is currently Chairman of the Board of the San Diego County Regional Airport Authority and a member of PCIP. Rozental is the former deputy foreign minister of Mexico and subsequently served as a foreign policy advisor to President Felipe Calder?n. He is the founding president of COMEXI and served as Vice Chair of the 2004-2005 Independent Task Force on North America (sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, the Mexican Council on Foreign Relations, and the Canadian Council of Chief Executives).

The project will also have two senior advisors: Abraham F. Lowenthal and Fernando Solana; Lowenthal will also serve as a member of the Task Force. Lowenthal is founding director of the Inter-American Dialogue and of the Woodrow Wilson Center?s Latin America Program; he is currently president emeritus and senior fellow of PCIP. Solana is a former Senator, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Education, Secretary of Foreign Relations, and president of Mexico?s central bank. He is currently the president of COMEXI.

Carlos Heredia and Chappell H. Lawson will serve as co-directors of the Task Force. Heredia is a senior researcher at the Center for Inter-American Studies at the Instituto Tecnol?gico Aut?nomo de M?xico and a member of COMEXI. As a Federal Deputy (1997-2000), he served as Legislative Coordinator for International Relations for the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). Lawson is an Associate Professor of political science at MIT and adjunct fellow at the Pacific Council on International Policy; he served as director of the 2004-2005 Independent Task Force on North America, organized by the Council on Foreign Relations, COMEXI, and the Canadian Council of Chief Executives.

Timeline
The Task Force leadership met in August 2008 to sketch out the project timeline, and convened in early October 2008 to refine the agenda for Task Force meetings. The Task Force itself will convene three times in 2009 ? in February 12-14, April 23-25, and June 18-20. The first meeting will take place in San Diego (with a trip across the border to Tijuana) and will cover issues of security and border facilitation. The second meeting will be held in Monterrey (Mexico), with a half-day visit to the border; it will cover migration and economic development. The third meeting, which will take place in Phoenix and include a trip to the border, will review conclusions from the previous sessions and devise recommendations on institutions.

Each session will include briefings and background papers by experts ? both members of the Task Force and non-members ? on the areas under discussion. By September 2009, the Task Force will produce a tightly focused report detailing its findings, recommendations, and long-term vision for the border region, aimed at policymakers, opinion leaders and the informed public. This report will reflect the consensus of the Task Force where possible and the sense of a majority of the individual members in other cases; an appendix will include any additional or disserting comments on specific points that members of the Task Force wish to add. A separate appendix will provide greater detail, where appropriate, on issues covered in the body of the report.